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SUMMARY
The article is an attempt to outline the manifestations of the legal and political system’s nihilism, 
the occurrence of which the author to some extent attributes to the policy of the Piłsudski political 
camp after 1926. The subject of the study is to determine the attitude of the leading activists of the 
Sanation camp to the political system practice and legal practice, seen for the purposes of this thesis 
as a certain set of actions contra legem and praeter legem in relation to the legal system in force. 
The author also analyzes the implications of J. Piłsudski’s lack of a concrete, in formal and legal 
terms, political program on the attitude of the Sanation political camp in relation to the application 
of law and on the legal security. The legal system turned out to be a factor significantly hindering the 
realization of the post-May camp’s plans as well as the effectiveness of the political system’s initia-
tives undertaken by the Piłsudski political camp. The main reason for the post-May camp’s frequent 
recourse to activities that are to some extent attributed to the legal or political system’s nihilism was 
the lack of deeper political intentions of the victor of the May Coup d’État.
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In the article, the author refers to several issues concerning the consideration on 
the legal and political system’s nihilism of the Sanation between 1926 and 19351. 
The time period indicated in the title is determined by two events characteristic of 
the period of the Piłsudski’s ruling in the Republic of Poland. On the one hand, the 
May 1926 Coup d’État, which had tragic consequences2, and on the other hand, the 
adoption of the so-called April Constitution under special legal circumstances3. The 
aim of the paper is not, however, to refer to the well-known and widely discussed 
in the doctrine such clear examples of legal nihilism in the political system’s prac-
tice of the post-May camp, such as the indicated events of May 1926, the 1930 
Brest elections or the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, written, as we know, for 
J. Piłsudski as the head of state. The subject of the study is the attempt to determine 
the attitude of the leading activists of the Sanation camp to the political system’s 
practice and legal practice, seen for the purposes of this thesis as a certain set of 
actions contra legem and praeter legem in relation to the legal system in force. The 
paper is a contribution to further research into the phenomenon of legal nihilism 
in the interwar period. In order to ensure the complementarity of the argument, 
several issues were referred to.
LEGAL NIHILISM – FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES
The concept of legal nihilism is an issue addressed so far in the doctrine of, i.a., 
A. Bosiacki and Z. Cywiński. A. Bosiacki, referring basically to totalitarian systems, 
especially communism, indicates that the following can be found in the catalog of 
characteristic features of legal nihilism: free shaping of the system of norms by the 
rulers; basing the structures of power on violence and terror; striving the authorities 
to free themselves from restrictive regulations; allowing the competences of the 
central decision-making center not to result from the constitution; vague indication 
1 The paper is an extended version of the author’s speech at the XVIII National Congress of 
Political and Legal Doctrine Historians entitled “The value of law. From legal absolutism to legal 
nihilism” (Lublin, September 17–19, 2019).
2 I mean, among other things, both the balance sheet of victims of street fighting in Warsaw and 
the consequences of the May Coup d’État for the cohesion of the Armed Forces. As it is known, the 
May Coup d’État broke the principle of the army’s apolitical service and tightened the polarization 
of political views among senior officers. This was determined by their attitude towards Piłsudski, 
both as the person and as their former superior, who stood against the Council of Ministers.
3 Constitutional Act of 23 April 1935 (Journal of Laws 1935, no. 30, item 227). The political 
context of the Constitution of 1935 is more broadly presented in: A. Ajnenkiel, [in:] Polskie kon-
stytucje, Warszawa 1991, p. 272 ff.
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of the competences of public administration bodies; broad formulation of general 
clauses; administrative repressions; contempt for the provisions of the current law; 
radical break with the current legal order; hindering the publication of normative 
acts; and finally, the rulers’ failure to specify their attitude to the law before taking 
power4. In the discussed period, unlike in totalitarian regimes, there was no State 
terror, but the Piłsudski political camp was striving to free themselves from the 
law. In the above-mentioned approach, the activities classified as legal nihilism are 
to serve both the political, systemic and tactical function.
Referring to the views of A. Kojder, Z. Cywiński indicated legal nihilism as 
distinguishing features, inter alia, “the instability of the law, hypertrophy of regu-
lations, faith in the omnipotence of the means of official law in shaping social life, 
instrumental use of the law, and finally, the escalation of repression”5. In Z. Cy-
wiński’s view, the law “deprived of autonomy and contaminated with nihilism” 
is influenced by “the legal values manifested by its creators and executors”6. In 
the context of the above-mentioned quotation, it should be emphasized that legal 
nihilism may also be a result of the lack of a concrete form of the concept of the 
governance model. This form, implemented on an ad hoc basis next to, or rather 
instead of, the procedures provided for in the letter of the Constitution, may even-
tually adopt a formula known from the post-May governments, in which formal 
decisions were made by the Council of Ministers, while the actual ones were made 
by extra-legal bodies, such as the so-called tenants or a group of colonels.
Based on these findings, it must be concluded that the leading activists of the 
Piłsudski political camp moved in a specific, political and ideological vacuum re-
sulting from Marshal Piłsudski’s lack of a coherent political program. Of course, 
the essence of the pragmatically presented issue of authoritarian governments is 
precisely the lack of a concrete political agenda. At that time, there was no program 
arranged or accepted by the Marshal, or even a plan that would demonstrate the 
winner’s intentions after the May Coup d’État. It is worth recalling here the words 
of A. Friszke, who pointed out that the ideological and programming issues were 
of no interest of Piłsudski7.
4 Cf. A. Bosiacki, Między nihilizmem prawnym a socjalistycznym normatywizmem. Z rozważań 
nad koncepcją prawa państwa stalinowskiego, [in:] O prawie i jego dziejach księgi dwie. Studia 
ofiarowane Profesorowi Adamowi Lityńskiemu w czterdziestopięciolecie pracy naukowej i siedem-
dziesięciolecie urodzin, vol. 2, Białystok–Katowice 2010, p. 117 ff.; idem, Utopia, władza, prawo. 
Doktryna i koncepcje prawne bolszewickiej Rosji 1917–1921, Warszawa 2012, p. 145 ff.
5 Z. Cywiński, Uwagi o nihilizmie prawnym, „Studia Iuridica” 1997, vol. 34, p. 22.
6 Ibidem.
7 Cf. A. Friszke, Wypowiedź w ramach Panelu historyczno-politologicznego, [in:] Polska Partia 
Socjalistyczna. Szkice, polemiki, wspomnienia. Dlaczego się nie udało?, ed. R. Spałek, Warszawa 2010, 
p. 394. Piłsudski’s allies of that time in the struggle for power – a grouping of the broadly understood 
Left, with particular emphasis on the Polish Socialist Party, before they became the Marshal’s political 
adversaries, had seen the need for a Coup d’État. This issue is discussed in the doctrine by: S. Micha-





On the one hand, this situation forced the Commander’s associates to base their 
work on Piłsudski’s scanty and rather chaotic press enunciations, while on the other 
hand, paradoxically, it left some room for creative attempts to work out new political 
system’s assumptions after May 1926. However, this way of working on draft leg-
islation, hoping that the project would be appreciated by the Marshal, did not work 
in practice. An example is the fate of the project to establish the Legion of Merit by 
W. Sławek, rejected by Piłsudski8. It is impossible not to mention the Marshal’s dissat-
isfaction with the way the April Constitution was adopted9. Perhaps it was a violation 
of imponderables valuable to the Marshal – vide the morality. The legal system in 
Piłsudski’s activity, despite some declarations and speeches – which will be shown 
– did not play a more important role. It is evidenced expressis verbis by the study by 
the politician dedicated to Piłsudski, the secretary of the parliamentary club BBWR, 
A. Piasecki, from 1931, in which he attempted to compile the Marshal’s statements on 
political system’s issues. In spite of the upper-legged title The Constitutional Theses of 
Marshal Piłsudski, the document directly proves that the Commander did not formulate 
“a rationalistic concept justifying one or another form of political system”10. A. Bo-
siacki, referring to the guidelines contained in The Constitutional Theses, points out 
that “they are one of the few sets of guidelines of this rank”11. He also points out that:
The starting point of Piłsudski’s thoughts on the shape of the State was to be realism typical for 
representatives of authoritarianism. Piasecki pointed out that Piłsudski was not characterized by the 
fact that the State was derived from social contract, civil society or eternal peace. For Piłsudski, the 
State was to be the State of “social balance”, without the predominance of the Left or Right or political 
parties’ fights. Strengthening the State and its authority was for Piłsudski a force of State power12.
łowski, Myśl polityczna Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej (1918–1939), Lublin 1994, p. 174 ff.; M. Śliwa, 
Polska myśl socjalistyczna (1918–1948), Wrocław 1988, p. 129. See also W. Kowalski, Stanowisko 
Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej wobec zamachu majowego 1926 roku, „Studia nad Autorytaryzmem 
i Totalitaryzmem” 2018, vol. 40(2), DOI: https://doi.org/10.19195/2300-7249.40.2.5, p. 103 ff.
8 In more detail, see W. Kowalski, Koncepcje ustrojowo-polityczne izby drugiej obozu piłsudczy-
kowskiego po przewrocie majowym, „Studia Iuridica” 2014, vol. 59, p. 177 ff. See also T. Chłopecki, 
Koncepcje elitaryzmu w myśli Walerego Sławka, [in:] Prace z myśli polityczno-prawnej oraz prawa 
publicznego, eds. M. Sadowski, P. Szymaniec, Wrocław 2012, p. 139 ff.
9 Paradoxically, the activity of Piłsudski in the work on the future constitution was not based 
on permanence. W.T. Kulesza (Koncepcje ideowo-polityczne obozu rządzącego w Polsce w latach 
1926–1935, Wrocław 1985, p. 52) draws attention to this fact when writing: “He [the Marshal] 
consistently strived to establish a catalog of important matters in which he reserved decisions and to 
leave the rest to his team. […] A characteristic manifestation of this selective absence of J. Piłsudski 
was the fact that he did not participate on constant basis in the works on changing the constitution”.
10 A. Piasecki, Tezy konstytucyjne Marszałka Piłsudskiego. Referat wygłoszony w dniu 28 lutego 
1931 r. u Marszałka Senatu Władysława Raczkiewicza, Warszawa 1931, p. 6.
11 A. Bosiacki, Ewolucja myśli polityczno-państwowej Józefa Piłsudskiego oraz jej wpływ na 
myśl społeczną i dokonania Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, „Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem” 
2015, vol. 37(2), p. 22.
12 Ibidem, pp. 22–23.
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If you trust the findings of W. Paruch:
[…] the views on the law and lawlessness were not a constitutive element for Józef Piłsudski’s 
formation, i.e. individual members and organizational structures were free to program in this matter, 
with one basic reservation that there were no discussions on the Marshal’s detailed decisions on the 
use of violence and the framework of certain legal solutions imposed by him. It was a condition of 
being a Piłsudian13.
W. Paruch, analyzing the use of both legal and illegal methods by the Piłsudians, 
stated that “the attitude towards them was not an intrinsic value. Yes, in conduct-
ing the policy, there was an attempt to move within the legal frameworks, but the 
possibilities to use force were also accepted”14.
THE ESSENCE OF LEGAL NIHILISM IN THE PRACTICE OF THE 
POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE SANATION
The legal nihilism in the practice of the Sanation political system, perceived 
as a flexible interpretation of constitutional regulations, exploitation of the lack of 
precision of regulations, recourse to legal formalism, depreciation of the meaning 
of legal usurps – the denial of this longa consuetudo, intimidation of the lawyer 
self-government societies, common electoral frauds, and finally the passing of laws 
contrary to the letter of the Constitution of 17 March 1921, was fostered, among 
others, by the reluctance of the Marshal of doctrine, mentioned by J. Jędrzejewicz. 
Jędrzejewicz gives a clear example of it, using the example of Piłsudski’s statement: 
“Give me a break with the doctrines. I hate that word, it is a terrible thing. All my 
life I have fought doctrines. It is our curse”15.
The lack of a concept of the victors of armed actions in the streets of Warsaw, 
so visible after 1926, was emphasized by W.T. Kulesza when writing: “Piłsudski 
did not create a coherent program of change, which would be expressed in a com-
13 W. Paruch, Prawo i bezprawie w myśli politycznej obozu piłsudczykowskiego w latach 1926–
1939: między siłą i prawem, czyli idea „pasa neutralnego” w polityce, „Annales UMCS. Sectio K” 
1994, vol. 1, p. 250.
14 Idem, Między dziedzictwem a współczesnością, czyli o podstawach ideologicznych myśli 
politycznej obozu piłsudczykowskiego (1926–1939), „Annales UMCS. Sectio K” 1998, vol. 5, p. 98.
15 J. Jędrzejewicz, W służbie idei. Fragmenty pamiętnika i pism, Londyn 1972, p. 196. See also 
J. Srokosz, W stronę silnego państwa. Koncepcje ustrojowe prawników obozu rządzącego w Polsce 
1926–1939, Warszawa–Kraków 2013, p. 69. It is impossible not to mention that the creation of un-
constitutional legal acts was facilitated by the lack of a constitutional judiciary in the Second Republic 
of Poland. The lack of consent to function within the framework of doctrines, which was emphasized 
by Piłsudski, is also mentioned by W. Jędrzejewicz (Józef Piłsudski 1867–1935. Życiorys, Londyn 
1996, p. 212).





prehensive draft of the Basic Law, but limited himself to fragmentary remarks about 
the issues he was interested in”16.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the previously planned program plans were 
inevitably replaced by ad hoc actions and system practice. G. Ławnikowicz, re-
ferring to S. Car’s statement, pointed out that “A classically shaped triad of values 
is contrasted with the principle – from practice to norm to principle”17. Aside from 
the completely illegal nature of the military speech of Marshal Piłsudski and his 
adherents in May 1926, the actions of the Sanators quickly and clearly revealed the 
real goals of this internally heterogeneous milieu gathered around the former Chief 
of State. This aim was undoubtedly to petrify and stabilize the acquired power. 
When the Parliament passed the Act of 2 August 1926 on the Amendment of the 
Constitution of 17 March 1921, the growing executive branch, which replaced the 
omnipotent Sejm, namely the government of K. Bartel and the tenant of the Royal 
Castle, I. Mościcki, who was in favor of him, showed at the head of the State’s 
supreme authorities18. The unsatisfactory results of the March 1928 elections, which 
gave the post-May political camp only a relative parliamentary majority had an 
impact on the methods used by the Sanation in the later period of de facto power19.
The Piłsudski’s approach to the legal system is accurately reflected in the words 
of the President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court A. Mogilnicki, 
dismissed in March 1929 by an apologist and a close associate of the Marshal, 
Minister of Justice S. Car. Mogilnicki saw this key jurist of the Piłsudski camp as 
the embodiment of the realities of the post-May ruling:
In finding appearances of law that were hiding lawlessness, Piłsudski’s invaluable helper was 
Stanisław Car. He was one of the most harmful people of the whole Sanation regime. An extremely 
talented, accomplished lawyer, however, was absolutely devoid of any ethical principles20.
Undoubtedly, it is the person of S. Car that is associated with the period of crea-
tive interpretation of legal regulations in a manner absolutely incompatible with the 
16 W.T. Kulesza, op. cit., p. 48. The program void of the Piłsudians is also accented by A. Bosiacki 
(Pomiędzy państwem prawnym a autorytaryzmem. Z polskich rozważań nad poszukiwaniem optymalnego 
ustroju państwa po odzyskaniu niepodległości w III Rzeczypospolitej, „Studia nad Autorytaryzmem 
i Totalitaryzmem” 2017, vol. 38(4), DOI: https://doi.org/10.19195/2300-7249.38.4.7, p. 100 ff.).
17 G. Ławnikowicz, Idea niezawisłości sędziowskiej w porządku prawnym i myśli prawniczej 
II Rzeczypospolitej, Toruń 2009, p. 31.
18 Act of 2 August 1926 Amending and Supplementing the Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland of 17 March 1921 (Journal of Laws 1926, no. 78, item 442).
19 Specifically, 125 seats for the Parliament members.
20 A. Mogilnicki, Wspomnienia adwokata i sędziego, Warszawa 2016, p. 303. A. Grudzińska’s 
doctoral dissertation entitled Koncepcje prawne Aleksandra Mogilnickiego. Prawo i prawnicy, de-
fended in 2014 (not published), was devoted to Mogilnicki’s legal concepts. The issue of S. Car’s 
controversial activity in the Piłsudski camp was discussed by J. Majchrowski (Stanisław Car – polska 
koncepcja autorytaryzmu, Warszawa 1996).




From May to Bereza: A Legal Nihilism in the Political and Legal Practice… 139
rules of legal interpretation21. The constitutional views of the Car reveal, moreover, 
the conviction, so characteristic of legal nihilism, that the importance of properly 
established laws and the legal norms they express is, in fact, dependent on the needs 
of the moment, the practice of the system, which, according to the Sanators, should 
be transformed, eventually moving away from legal formalism. S. Car in his work 
The Constitution of March 17 and the Polish Reality contained a specific credo of the 
Sanation ruling in the political system field. He wrote there such significant words: 
“[…] the constitutional life of the state does not always coincide with the letter of 
constitutional law”22. Such reasoning led the Sanation lawyer to quite surprising 
conclusions, which were in fact an attempt to justify the May Coup d’État. According 
to S. Car, practically all the governments appointed after the entry into force of the 
Constitution of 17 March 1921 were not parliamentary governments (sic!). Criticiz-
ing the pre-May period of the Sejm-cracy, he stated directly: “Life has crossed the 
doctrine”. The governmental circles based on this conviction applied after May 1926 
the famous “constitutional tricks”, as the above-mentioned A. Mogilnicki described 
the extra-legal activities of the Sanation, one of the most famous of which was the 
convening of an extraordinary session of the Sejm and Senate at the request of the par-
liamentarians of the Center-Left alliance of political parties. As it is known, on 24 May 
1930, President Mościcki issued an order to postpone the extraordinary session of the 
Sejm for 30 days. At the end of June, the session was closed, the parliamentarians 
did not even meet for the meeting23. It is impossible not to quote the words of an 
excellent publicist, head of the Ministry of Treasury and trusted Piłsudian, Colonel 
I. Matuszewski: “For not the texts themselves, but only those supported by tradition, 
not the paragraphs themselves, but their reflection in the facts – they create the law”24.
21 The examples are the actions taken by S. Car in connection with the President’s November 4, 
1926 decree, the so-called press decree. See Regulation of the President of the Republic of Poland of 
5 November 1926 on penalties for spreading untrue news and on penalties for insulting authorities and 
their representatives (Journal of Laws 1926, no. 110, item 640). In view of the intransigent position of the 
Sejm, which repealed the presidential decree on December 11, 1926, the then Minister of Justice S. Car, 
who was responsible for the editorial office of the Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw), refused to publish 
a resolution on the non-approval of the press decree. Details of the Car’s behind-the-scenes activities for 
maintaining the press law in force are interestingly presented by A. Mogilnicki (Wspomnienia adwokata…, 
p. 304 ff.). The issue of the evolution of press laws in the interwar period was presented by R. Habielski 
(Ewolucja prawa prasowego w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej. Zakres i recepcja, „Studia Medioznawcze” 
2013, no. 4, p. 79 ff.). It should be reminded that it was as late as in 1927 that the regulation by the head 
of state regulating the sphere of press law was published. See Regulation of the President of the Republic 
of Poland of 10 May 1927 on press law (Journal of Laws 1927, no. 45, item 398).
22 S. Car, Konstytucja 17 marca a polska rzeczywistość, Warszawa 1930, p. 8.
23 Por. „Gazeta Robotnicza. Organ Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej Górnego Śląska i Zagłębia 
Dąbrowskiego” 25.05.1930, no. 120, p. 1.
24 I. Matuszewski, Próby syntez, Warszawa 1937, pp. 139–140. On Matuszewski’s legal concepts, 
see W. Kowalski, Koncepcje prawne Ignacego Matuszewskiego w okresie II Rzeczypospolitej, „Studia 
Iuridica” 2016, vol. 66, p. 135 ff.





This conviction was shared by the leaders of the Piłsudski camp. It was in line 
with the views of leading activists gathered around Piłsudski. The people who came 
from the generation of people accustomed to the activity – vide members of the for-
mer Polish Socialist Party Fighting Organization (Pol. OB PPS), prioritized actions 
and activities within the framework of their system of values over the development 
of the doctrine of the post-May political camp or, among others, the program of 
the political party. The latter, of even fundamental importance for the realization of 
political assumptions, was to enable the transposition of the camp leader’s general 
legal and political system views into the party’s specific program assumptions. As 
A. Chojnowski points out, from the point of view of the leader of the Sanation 
camp, the goals for which the new political organization was to be created were 
dictated by pragmatism and the needs of the ad hoc parliamentary tactics.
[…] the goals [of the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government, in Polish – BBWR] 
were vague. Piłsudski’s approach was quite pragmatic – he wanted to have at his disposal a group 
of disciplined, active people, capable – as he had put it – of effective “diversion” in fighting the 
anti-Sanation opposition. In this sense, the BBWR was to be, first and foremost, a “voting machine” 
and, moreover, the instrument of propaganda influence on social moods25.
A peculiar irony of fate is the fact that the described events took place with the 
permission of the honoris causa PhD in Law awarded by the Jagiellonian University 
on 29 April 1921 – J. Piłsudski. In his speech, on the occasion of being awarded 
with the title, he stated, referring to the period of holding the office of the Chief of 
State: “My first determination was to seek the law and to strengthen the sense of 
law in the whole nation”26. As it can be seen, Piłsudski has moved far away from 
the idea of the State of law, which he himself stressed counter-pointedly in his 
speech to the lower house of the Parliament, questioning whether it is still possible 
to “rule without a whip” in Poland27.
So the words of A. Mogilnicki seem to be right when he wrote that “Piłsudski 
disregarded the law and often said it clearly, but he did not want to commit law-
lessness too openly, and when committing it, he always looked for appearances of 
law”28. As it seems, this is the basis of S. Car’s dynamic career.
25 A. Chojnowski, BBWR – antypartyjna partia piłsudczyków, „Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci 
Narodowej” 2008, no. 5–6, p. 66.
26 M. Rogala, Józef Piłsudski i jego kontakty z prawem, „Palestra” 1998, no. 11–12, p. 15.
27 Przemówienie Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego do przedstawicieli stronnictw sejmowych 
29 maja 1926 r., www.jpilsudski.org/przemowienia-odezwy-rozkazy/1267-przemowienie-marszalka
-jozefa-pilsudskiego- do-przedstawicieli-stronnictw-sejmowych-29-maja-1926-r [access: 8.11.2020].
28 A. Mogilnicki, Wspomnienia adwokata…, p. 301.
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LEGAL NIHILISM AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING 
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES
The starting point for the application of a political practice based on the in-
strumental treatment of the law as a means aiming to enable the strengthening of 
the executive power while abandoning the erroneous French political patterns was 
the key belief that the May Coup d’État could be legalized. It is worth recalling 
the legalistic sarcasm of S. Car when he pointed out “the preservation of all legal 
forms” during the election of Marshal Piłsudski as the head of state29. According 
to the Sanation jurist “by a legal act from the Sejm, the May events have been 
closed”. W. Makowski, another well-known Piłsudians’ lawyer, spoke in a more 
moderate form. In June 1926, he mentioned the need “to reorganize democracy”30.
The sources of elements of legal nihilism in the political system practice of the 
post-May political camp can also be found in the resignation of Marshal Piłsudski 
from the position of President, for which Piłsudski was elected by the National 
Assembly31. According to A. Bosiacki, the decision to resign from the State Office 
impacted “the intensification of activities in the political reality beyond the legal 
norms, in which the Marshal was not only present, but also with such reality he 
was apparently satisfied”32. Moving outside the legal frameworks was obviously 
convenient for Marshal Piłsudski, allowing him to use ad hoc political tactics, as 
Diariusz written by K. Świtalski expressis verbis reveals33.
To show examples of the influence of Piłsudians’ legal nihilism on both the 
legislation and the State political system, it is worthwhile to refer to the Regula-
tion of the President of the Republic of Poland of 6 February 1928 – Law on the 
Common Court System34. As can be deduced from the content of this legal act, 
the essential aim of its adoption was indeed the necessary unification of the judi-
ciary in the State, but it is impossible not to see that, by the way, it was decided to 
introduce provisions (especially the famous Article 284) that made it possible to 
subordinate the judiciary branch of government to Sanators and a violation of the 
29 S. Car, Józef Piłsudski a Państwo Polskie, Warszawa 1930, p. 36.
30 W. Makowski, Rozwiązanie Sejmu, [in:] Zmiana konstytucji. Mowy i oświadczenia Ministra 
Sprawiedliwości Prof. Wacława Makowskiego, Warszawa 1926, p. 14. The then Minister of Justice, 
W. Makowski, spoke similarly, less than a month after the May Coup d’État, saying: “[…] the State 
needs the law” (idem, Wywiad w Nowym Kurierze Polskim, [in:] Zmiana konstytucji…, p. 18). See 
also: idem, Wacław Makowski o państwie społecznym, Warszawa 1998.
31 As you know, the Marshal did not accept the election. See J. Piłsudski, Pismo do marszałka 
Sejmu, zawiadamiające o nieprzyjęciu urzędu Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej, [in:] idem, Pisma zbio-
rowe, vol. 9, Warszawa 1938, p. 33.
32 A. Bosiacki, Pomiędzy państwem prawnym a autorytaryzmem…, p. 100. See also idem, 
Ewolucja myśli polityczno-państwowej Józefa Piłsudskiego…, p. 7 ff.
33 K. Świtalski, Diariusz 1919–1935, Warszawa 1992.
34 Journal of Laws 1928, no. 12, item 93.





constitutionally guaranteed principle of non-removal of judges, as provided for in 
Article 78 of the March Constitution. It should be reminded that the new regula-
tions, although grossly unconstitutional, entered into force and made it possible, 
among other things, to deprive the positions of four Supreme Court presidents35. 
Z. Dworski, B. Pohorocki, W. Seyda and A. Mogilnicki were those who had been 
retired. It is worth noting that the effect of the regulation’s entry into force was 
that the President, at the request of the Minister of Justice, transferred about six 
hundred judges (sic!)36.
An obvious manifestation of the view of the Sanation practitioners on the issue of 
the stability of the legal system and judicial independence was the issue by President 
I. Mościcki of the Regulation of the President of the Republic of Poland of 23 Au-
gust 1932 amending certain provisions of the law on the Common Court System37. 
The issue of the aforementioned act was one of the last stages of subordinating the 
Piłsudski political camp to the justice system in Poland. A clear expression of the 
lack of respect for the aforementioned essential values, necessary for the existence of 
the State that is part of the democratic model, was to reduce the principle of judicial 
independence to a rhetorical formula contained in the Constitution.
The legal nihilism discussed was reflected in the adoption of a provision in the 
August amendment that allowed for a significant increase in the President’s power of 
lawmaking or the right to dissolve Parliament’s chambers on his own, which clearly 
distorted the sense of the model of relations between the legislative branch and 
the executive branch, adopted in March 1921. As it is known, the aforementioned 
political solution, which determines the preference of the legislative branch over the 
executive branch, was taken from the constitutional model of the Third French Re-
public. Paradoxically, the amendment was adopted by the votes of the Right-wing, 
against which Piłsudski opposed in May 1926, and not the Polish Socialist Party, 
which supported the May Coup d’État ideally and practically.
It is also worth pointing out that a manifestation of Sanators’ conduct related 
to political nihilism, which was hardly noticed in the doctrine, was the Piłsudski 
camp’s search for people highly disposed to the Sanation, especially within the 
justice system, who were allowed to authorize strictly political decisions in court. 
There is no doubt that the formula of authoritarian ruling favored radicalization of 
attitudes. It is not a coincidence that the sentencing by such judges as J. Rykacze-
wski and K. Hermanowski, the activity of S. Giżycki – Chief Election Commis-
35 The reform of the justice system was subject to substantive criticism by the President of the 
Supreme Court, A. Mogilnicki, who himself, under Article 284 of the Regulation of the President of 
the Republic of Poland of 6 February 1928 – Law on the Common Court System, was retired. See 
discussion of the effects of the reform in: A. Mogilnicki, Niezawisłość sędziów w nowym ustroju 
sądowym, „Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska” 1928, no. 10–14.
36 The author submits the data following: idem, Wspomnienia adwokata…, p. 330.
37 Journal of Laws 1932, no. 73, item 661.
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sioner or, counter-pointedly, the prosecutor C. Michałowski – is identified with 
the Sanation ruling.
An evidence of the Piłsudski camp’s acceptance for the use of methods char-
acterized by legal and political nihilism, defined at the beginning of the paper, 
was the Piłsudski’s reference to methods indicated by researchers as being based 
on violence. The idealized image of sanating social and political relations in the 
country by the new political group was confronted with the institution of so-called 
unknown perpetrators. As can be assumed from numerous accounts, they came from 
a group of officers in active service and were responsible for cases of beatings and 
intimidation (vide the famous raid on S. Cywiński). The radicalization of attitudes 
was not limited to short-term activities, but was accompanied by the issuing of legal 
acts that were completely contrary to the principles of a democratic State. A clear 
example is the issuance of the famous Regulation of the President of the Republic 
of Poland of 17 June 1934 on persons threatening security, peace and public order38.
As it is well known, the Regulation was the basis for setting up the retreat camp 
in Bereza Kartuska. As soon as it was issued, the government administration was 
able to request a ruling on forced retreat by referring it to the court, specifically to 
the investigating judge. The legal structure of this proposal was to be based only 
on suspicion. No evidence proceedings or court judgement was required in the 
preparatory proceedings. Expressis verbis the character of this twentieth-century 
Lettre de cachet was manifested in the text of Article 4 of the Regulation, which 
made as typical the possibility of multiple extensions of the retreat. “The retreat 
may be pronounced for three months; it may be prolonged by the behavior of the 
retreat for a further three months, in accordance with the procedure set out in Ar-
ticle 2”, i.e. the retreat pronounced by a decision by the investigating judge at the 
request of the government authority. It should be noted that the feature illustrating 
the functioning of the legal system in an authoritarian State was, therefore, that 
the legislator based on general clauses in the sphere of regulations reserved for 
criminal law. Such actions caused atrophy of the authority of both the law itself and, 
paradoxically, the Sanation camp in the sight of the public opinion of the time39.
38 Journal of Laws 1934, no. 50, item 473.
39 Awareness, among some of the leading Sanation activists, of such risk is now known. This 
is illustrated, among others, by the statement of K. Świtalski at the meeting on July 2, 1934, with 
the presence of L. Kozłowski, J. Beck, W. Sławek and A. Prystor. According to the author of Diary 
(Pol. Diariusz), he expressed with reserve his opinion on the advisability to create a retreat camp in 
Bereza Kartuska. According to Świtalski, the prisoners’ stay in the camp could lead to radicalization. 
According to this testimony, the leaders of the group present at the meeting generally shared the view 
expressed by Świtalski (op. cit., p. 663). It is also worth recalling A. Chojnowski’s findings regarding 
the unrest within the parliamentary club of the Non-Partisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Gov-
ernment (Pol. BBWR) in the face of the so-called Brest case and the disclosure to the public of the 
degrading treatment of the leaders of the opposition groups imprisoned in Brest. Cf. A. Chojnowski, 
Piłsudczycy u władzy. Dzieje Bezpartyjnego Bloku Współpracy z Rządem, Wrocław 1986, p. 174 ff.





There is also no doubt that basing the construction of penal laws on general 
clauses violated the principle of the definition of penal laws, thus undermining the 
legal security of the State. Such an action created an interesting paradox – on the 
one hand, under the slogan of protecting security, peace and public order, a system 
was created that enabled de facto deportation of an individual to a place where his 
or her fundamental rights were to be supposedly violated. On the other hand, such 
actions resulted in a noticeable decrease in citizens’ confidence in the State and the 
stability of principles of the political system.
A characteristic feature of the process of taking over power by the Piłsudians 
in the 1920s, as well as the gradual increase in the role of the Piłsudski camp’s 
environment on the political scene at the time, was the desire to cause rifts in the 
opposition parties by the secret adherents of Piłsudski. The best known example 
of such action is that of J. Moraczewski, who, without the consent of the Central 
Executive Committee of the Polish Socialist Party, in October 1926 took over the 
position of Minister of Public Works in Piłsudski’s government40. It is also worth 
recalling the creation of a rival grouping to the Polish Socialist Party, i.e. the PPS 
– the former Revolutionary Faction.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, it should be noted that the legal nihilism in the activity of the 
Sanators did not seem to be entirely intentional, as it was not accompanied by an 
ideological, or resulting from a political program, which, as it was finally pointed 
out, despite some attempts, was not formulated, the conviction of the irrelevance of 
the law as such. Also, S. Car’s considerations about the importance of the legal norm 
in G. Jellinek’s concept were of an isolated nature and were probably intended to 
preserve certain appearances of legalism and respect for recognized legal concepts. 
For the pragmatist and the man of the deed, as undoubtedly Marshal Piłsudski was, 
what mattered most was the effectiveness of actions and the efficiency of a certain 
political system’s tactic. Its content, de iure and de facto, was filled in by the polit-
ical camp’s practitioners – S. Car and a group of the Marshal’s closest associates, 
40 This can be exemplified by the fact that Piłsudians were causing rifts on the Left, which, para-
doxically – in view of the socialist card in Piłsudski’s biography – was the Marshal’s natural political 
background. As we know, Piłsudski did not identify with the parliamentary Left-wing circles after 
regaining independence by the State. The attempts to gain the Left’s support was only temporary and 
instrumental in nature. The emanation of such conduct was Piłsudski’s extremely quick rejection of 
any political concessions to the Polish Socialist Party by the winner of the May Coup d’État, at the 
end of July 1926. See W. Kowalski, Między demokratyzmem a autorytaryzmem – kształtowanie się 
programu politycznego PPS przed i po maju 1926 roku, „Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitary-
zmem” 2019, vol. 41(3), DOI: https://doi.org/10.19195/2300-7249.41.3.8, p. 143. 
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led by W. Sławek and K. Świtalski. The legal system turned out to be a factor that 
significantly hindered both the realization of the post-May political camp’s plans 
and the effectiveness of actions taken by the Piłsudians. The truthfulness of this 
view is evidenced by the fact that nine years have passed between the May Coup 
d’État by the Marshal’s supporters and the entry into force of the new constitution 
in April 1935. The adoption of the April Constitution in 1935 was an obvious time 
caesura for this phenomenon. It was the final result of a process initiated in May 
1926, in which the ideology and political program was replaced by pragmatics and 
ad hoc actions, and a specific victim of such modernization of the constitutional 
order was both the quality and stability of law.
It seems that the main reason for the political camp’s frequent recourse to the 
activities attributed to legal and political nihilism was the lack of concrete inten-
tions of the victor of the May Coup d’État. As it has been repeatedly pointed out 
in the literature, Piłsudski did not develop a coherent doctrine of the ruling camp. 
Such attempts, unsuccessfully, were made by his closest associates. Both the lack 
of a political program and the heterogeneous structure of the Marshal’s political 
background meant that political goals, both tactical, e.g. elections, and strategic, 
e.g. the adoption of a new constitution, were often achieved in an ad hoc manner41.
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STRESZCZENIE
Artykuł stanowi próbę zarysowania przejawów nihilizmu prawnego i ustrojowego, których 
występowanie autor w pewnym zakresie przypisuje polityce obozu piłsudczykowskiego po 1926 r. 
Przedmiotem opracowania jest określenie stosunku czołowych działaczy obozu sanacyjnego do 
praktyki ustrojowej i prawnej, rozumianej na potrzeby niniejszego wywodu jako pewien zbiór działań 
zarówno contra legem, jak i praeter legem wobec obowiązującego systemu prawnego. Autor analizuje 
również implikacje braku skonkretyzowanego w sensie formalno-prawnym programu politycznego 
J. Piłsudskiego na stosunek obozu sanacyjnego do stosowania prawa oraz na bezpieczeństwo prawne. 
System prawny okazał się być czynnikiem w znacznym stopniu krępującym realizację zamierzeń 
obozu pomajowego oraz efektywność podejmowanych przez piłsudczyków inicjatyw ustrojowych. 
Zasadniczym powodem tak częstego sięgania przez obóz pomajowy do działań, którym w pewnej 
mierze przypisuje się charakter nihilizmu prawnego czy ustrojowego, był brak głębszych zamierzeń 
ustrojowych zwycięzcy zamachu majowego.
Słowa kluczowe: nihilizm prawny; Piłsudski; sanacja; zamach majowy; bezpieczeństwo prawne
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